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Preliminary Report

U-2 RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS C465C and C475C
Flown 25 and 26 August 1965

BYE-35425/65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Directorate of Science and Technology

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

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MISSION HIGHLIGHTS

Mission C465C, flown on 25 August 1965, was over Hainan Island for about 45 minutes. It provided photographic coverage of 10 COMOR targets. Chinese Communist air warning facilities tracked the mission continuously for over 2 1/2 hours. There were no fighter reactions or air-to-surface missile (AAM) or surface-to-air missile (SAM) threats to the mission. System 13* and Oscar/Sierra* activity did not correlate with any SAM threats.

Mission C475C, flown on 26 August 1965, was over southeast and east China for about 2 hours and 47 minutes. It provided photographic coverage of 33 COMOR targets. Chinese Communist air warning facilities tracked the mission continuously for almost 4 3/4 hours except for two brief breaks, one seaward from Taiwan and the other, briefly, southwest of Shanghai. Of the seven fighter reactions to the mission, two MiG-21 reactions were threats to the mission, but no fighters were sighted or photographed from the U-2. No air-to-air missile (AAM) or surface-to-air missile (SAM) threats to the mission were detected. A number of instances of System 13 activity did not correlate with any SAM threat.

*System 13 jams the S-band signals from the SA-2 FAN SONG target and missile tracking radar. Oscar/Sierra warns the pilot of the L-band SA-2 Guideline missile command signal.

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BACKGROUND
Missions C465C and C475C

Mission C465C was flown on 25 August 1965 in response to COMOR requirements for high resolution photographic coverage of Hainan Island.

This requirement is for weekly coverage of one-quarter of the priority targets and monthly coverage of all targets in South China.

the mission U-2 was over denied territory for approximately 45 minutes, returning to base at 0620Z. The pilot reported the weather better than the forecast, which called for Catagory II (scattered), variable Catagory III (broken) cloud coverage. There were no reported deviations from the planned route.

C475C, a Formosa Strait mission, was flown on 26 August 1965 to satisfy priority requirements of the arising from a temporary reduction of capabilities. Several COMOR targets were also covered by the mission.

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Taking off at 0036Z, the U-2 crossed the coast of the Chinese mainland south of Hong Kong, thence north to Hanchow and exited China east of Wenchow after two hours and forty-seven minutes over denied territory. The pilot reported the weather as better than the forecast Catagory II (scattered), variable III (broken) cloud coverage. No deviations from the planned route were reported.

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ANALYTICAL FINDINGS
Mission C465C
25 August 1965

AIR DEFENSE REACTIONS

Radar Tracking -- Chinese Communist air warning facilities tracked the U-2 continuously for four hours and 38 minutes, for a total of 1,840 nautical miles at a computed ground speed of 415 knots.

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The Chinese radar track corresponded very closely with the pilot's reported flight path; the greatest deviation, only about 20 nautical miles, was on the return leg, east of Hainan Island. Chinese Communist air defense facilities reported altitudes between 65,600 and 71,116 feet for the mission, while the pilot reported flying at altitudes ranging from 68,300 to 70,000 feet.

Fighter Reactions -- No fighter reactions to the mission were noted.

Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) Reactions -- No SAM threats to the mission were detected. Several System 13 reactions and two instances of Oscar/Sierra activity do not correlate with Elint or other indications of SAM activity.

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PHOTOGRAPHY

Preliminary readout of the photography indicates that the mission covered the following targets on Hainan Island: 2 missile targets; 4 airfields; 5 naval installations; 11 military targets; 1 BW/CW facility; 2 electronics sites; and one urban complex. In all, 10 COMOR targets were covered in fair to good photography.

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Mission C475C
26 August 1965

AIR DEFENSE REACTIONS

Radar Tracking -- Chinese Communist air warning facilities initially detected the mission aircraft and identified it as a large type hositle aircraft at 0043Z, seven minutes after take-off (altitude 34,440 feet). The U-2 was tracked continuously for four hours and 42 minutes, except for one period of 15 minutes southwest of Taiwan and a brief sector one of 5 minutes southwest of Shanghai, for a total of 1,750 nautical miles at a computed ground speed of 375 knots. The U-2 was lost by Chinese Communist tracking facilities at 0525Z, 20 minutes before landing. The Chinese Communist radar tracking was extremely accurate for most of the route over denied territory: the Chinese radar track and the pilot's reported flight path agree very closely except for the sector a few miles before the second break in tracking, where a divergence of almost 25 nautical miles was noted between the two routes. Since the radar track of the mission aircraft was lost by the Chinese Communists for a brief period during this sector and regained at a point close to the pilot's reported route, the latter is

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believed to have been the more correct. The radar tracking facilities reported altitudes ranging from [redacted] feet for the mission, while the pilot reported his flight altitudes gradually increasing from [redacted]. 25X1 25X1

Fighter Reactions -- At least seven Chinese Communist fighters were noted in seven reactions to the mission, at least two of which constituted threats to the mission but were not sighted by the pilot, noted in photography, or reflected in Elint. Comint and Elint indicates reaction number 1 was a MiG-17 or MiG-19 and was no threat. Reactions numbers 2, 3, 4, and 5 were evidently MiG-21s, the first three probably out of Nan-Chang, and the last out of Wuhu. Reaction number 2 closed to about three nautical miles but failed to achieve sufficient altitude. According to the Chinese tracking reports, reactions number 4 and 5 each merged with the U-2 at about the mission altitude -- number 4 at the same altitude and number 5 slightly higher. According to the pilot, he was some 1,500 feet higher than the Chinese reported at the time of reaction number 4 and less than 200 feet higher at the time of reaction number 5. Since reaction number 4 made a better approach, he was probably the more important

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threat; the absence of other evidence than Comint tracking reports precludes the possibility of more definitive evaluation of these reactions. There was no evidence of air-to-air missile (AAM) threats in connection with any of the reactions, and there was no System 9 activity on the mission.

Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) Reactions -- There were no indications of SAM threats to the mission. A number of instances of System 13 activity do not correlate with any other indications of SAM activity.

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Table 2

Radars Deployed in China and Intercepted by Missions C465C and C475C

Early Warning		**Height Finder**	
SCR-270	(1,2)	ROCK CAKE	(1,2)
MOON CONE	(1,2)		
KNIFE REST B	(1,2)	**AAA Fire Control**	
CROSS SLOT	(1,2)	WHIFF	(2)
TACHI-18	(1)	FIRE CAN	(1,2)
Ground Control Intercept			
TOKEN	(1,2)	**Navigation**	
BIG MESH	(1,2)	MUSHROOM	(1,2)
Airborne Intercept		NEPTUN	(2)
SCAN ODD	(2)		

(1) Intercepted on Mission C465C

(2) Intercepted on Mission C475C

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SOURCES

This preliminary technical evaluation of two U-2 Reconnaissance Missions flown over Communist China on 25 and 26 August 1965 was developed for the 303 Committee by the following elements of the Directorate of Science and Technology:

Office of Scientific Intelligence

Office of Special Activities

Office of Elint

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Joint Sobe Sigint Processing Center, Okinawa

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